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A Xerox of India? Policies and Politics of 
Migration in an overseas colony 
Introducing Mini-India 
 
“The Andaman society is like a Xerox copy of India”. With this metaphor, my local in-
terlocutor did not intend to reduce the whole population of this group of islands in the 
Bay of Bengal to mere paper existence. He alluded to his own society, called 'Mini-
India'. Most Andaman people refer to the icon of Mini-India when they represent their 
multi-ethnic, but nonetheless Indian, society. Such statement is not self-evident: the 
strategically important islands are located more than thousand kilometres away from 
the Indian subcontinent.  
Despite geographical vicinity to the South-East Asian countries of Myanmar, Thailand 
and Indonesia, the territory of the Andamans belongs to India.1 This is due to the is-
lands' historical entanglement with the British Empire and the ensuing Indian nation-
state. The present population came into being due to colonial and postcolonial set-
tlement and social-engineering policies.2 Resemblances of the contemporary Anda-
man society with larger representations of the Indian nation can, therefore, be re-
garded as manifestation of this very history. 
Andaman Indians hail from different regions, ethnic groups, castes and creeds of the 
Indian subcontinent. Some smaller sections have come from Burma, too. The term 
Mini-India serves to symbolically incorporate highly diverse migratory backgrounds 
“from Kashmir to Kanyakumari” into an encompassing model of nationalism. It indi-
cates that the society represents a harmonious 'unity in diversity' due to the ideals of 
the secular nation-state; however, contrary to such obvious declarations of attach-
ment and belonging to Bharat Mata, or Mother  India,  'mainland'  Indians, in  general, 
have very  limited knowledge about the territory. Few are aware that there are ap-
proximately five hundred thousand island inhabitants. This perception can be regard-
ed as a result of two dominant forms of mass media representation.   
First, the islands are projected as space of Orientalist fantasy. Since pre-colonial times, 
travel accounts, among others from Marco Polo, have depicted them as tropical is-
lands inhabited by 'savages'.3 Continuous media coverage of the indigenous people 
has reiterated a persisting imaginary that the archipelago consists of large tracks of 
'virgin' forest; within this tropical fantasy, the supposedly 'Noble Savages' function as 
                       
1 I am not going to focus on the southern Nicobar Islands, which, together with the Andamans, constitute a Union  
Territory of India that comprises more than three hundred islands.  
2 A particular kind of regional 'shadow existence', marked by economic dependence from the centre and dis-
coursive hegemony, have remained a salient feature in the islands since colonial times. Such form of governance 
has been informed by Indian overseas migrations from the larger British Empire, by discourses in the Indian nation-
state, and by the transnational sphere, each highlighting an outsider's view on Andaman policies.  
3 The Andaman hunter-gatherers migrated to the islands several thousand years ago. A large body of monographs – 
like Radcliffe-Brown’s anthropological classic “The Andaman Islanders” (1922), but also more recent works, e.g. by 
Pandya (2009), Sen, S. (2010), Sekhsaria (2003), and Venkateswar (2004) – have been written about them. 
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exotic signifier of 'nature'.4 In the last decade, the expanding tourism industry has tak-
en up this paradigm of an 'untouched' frontier to market mass compatible 'dream' 
holidays in a 'paradise lost'.  
The second perception of the Andamans has to do with the anti-colonial struggle. In 
the aftermath of the Mutiny/ Rebellion of 1857 (Anderson, 2007), state-directed de-
portation of political and criminal convicts served the colonization of the islands. For 
the British Empire, the Andaman penal colony functioned as permanent outpost in the 
Indian Ocean. Overseas transportation, in general, meant that many convicts and in-
dentured labourers did not return to their homelands. They either died or settled 
down at these destinations; the dread, anxiety, and uncertainty of their relatives and 
friends who stayed back on the subcontinent, was associated with the allegory of Kala 
Pani, literally the “black water” (Bose, 2006, p.24; Mathur, 1984, p.1; Sen, S., 2000, 
p.5).  
In the wake of nationalist consciousness and mobilisation at the beginning of the 20th 
century, media reports and rumours about the deportation of revolutionaries to the 
Andamans contributed to the islands' discoursive embodiment as one synonym for 
Kala Pani. This image was gradually reiterated through narratives about freedom 
fighters like the famous Veer Savarkar. Their imprisonment in the notorious Andaman 
Cellular Jail was memorized as 'martyrdom' for the nation-to-be. Thus, for subsequent 
generations of Indians, the islands have transformed into an imaginative site of patri-
otism and the freedom struggle.5  
Beyond evolutionist representations of 'savagery' or elitist glorifications of the nation, 
this paper focuses on largely unnoticed consequences of historical processes of over-
seas migration and place-making in the islands.6 Like the former two grand narratives, 
Mini-India is a representation of the Andaman society; a product of hegemonic rela-
tions of power and knowledge that is efficacious in the islanders' every-day life. 
As early as 1937, the colony's social and cultural diversity had been conceptualized as 
India in “miniature form” (Dass, 2001, p. 73).7 After independence, government serv-
ants and academics have continued to portray the Andaman society as “Mini-India” (cf. 
Das, 1982, p.110). Many had the urge to incorporate the multitude of colonial and 
postcolonial migrants into a common national framework of multi-culturalism: each 
                       
4 After the 2004 Tsunami had hit the islands, the indigenous people were in the focus of global media reports. 
These represented their 'miraculous' survival – they had saved their lives by following the animals' retreat in antici-
pation of the waves – as result of their 'proximity to nature'. Despite the availability of detailed knowledge about 
the indigenous Andaman islanders, many foreign and domestic tourists believe that they are cannibals. Such dis-
crepancy between factual knowledge and Orientalist myth is symptomatic of the postcolonial condition. 
5 For a discussion of reverberations of the freedom struggle, see Zehmisch, P. 2011. Freedom Fighters or Criminals? 
Postcolonial Subjectivities in the Andaman Islands, South-East India. in: Pannu, P.(ed.). Kontur, Nr. 22: Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Subjectivities. 4-16.  
[http://kontur.au.dk/fileadmin/www.kontur.au.dk/Kontur_22/ZEHMISCH_MOD1.pdf]  
6 Despite pointing out ethnographic particularities, I regard my study as embedded in larger theoretical debates of 
migration and place-making. I understand place-making as a cultural practice of settlement that involves a trans-
formation of spaces into places (cf. Gupta/ Ferguson, 1997). In migration context, place-making connotes not only 
the process of adaptation to the physical and human environment, but also the exercise of political commitment in 
that place. This often implies people's inscription in public spaces through “naming, rituals and institutions“ (Pas-
coe, 1992). In migration contexts like the Andamans, one can observe how migrants literally 'made' a place by 
settling down in a particular setting, establishing social relationships and an attachment to the place, which culmi-
nated in political identification and engagement.   
7 The Census 1901 had already listed forty-five linguistic groups in the penal settlement (Temple 1909: 64). 
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individual has been categorized as member of, at least, one specific migrant communi-
ty;8 all of these communities, in turn, have been represented as 'organic' components 
of a 'whole', the Indian nation. While these writers ascribed Otherness to each com-
munity, they proclaimed a common 'Indian-ness' as unifying element (cf. Das, 1982, 
p.74-5; Naidu, 1998, p.246; Dhingra, 2005, p.155).  
The idea of the Indian nation, depicted with the trope 'unity in diversity', serves here 
to classify, divide and encompass a society in the making. Due to hegemonic national-
ist discourse, representations of the Andaman 'melting pot' as Mini-India have not 
only become omni-present in public and private contexts. Moreover, the local model 
of multi-culturalism has established as framework of 'speaking' the language of the 
secular state. In order to be 'listened', most Andamanis have, thus, appropriated Mini-
India as collective self-representation of their society.9 
During eighteen months of fieldwork on the islands, most of my interlocutors con-
fronted me with utterances about Mini-India and its supposed qualities. It is, thus, 
worthwhile asking in how far these representations of communal harmony corre-
spond to my empirical observations. Do they really cohabit in the manner one is sup-
posed to believe? Indeed, I have found a lot of congruence between nationalist depic-
tions of the society, and local values, norms and practices. My every-day experience 
has confirmed that – apart from mandatory lip services to the nation – there are con-
crete manifestations of secular ideology.  
As described in the literature, I have frequently observed that people embrace 'Neh-
ruvian' ideas: religion is regarded mostly as private matter (cf. Mathur, 1985, p.264); a 
large number of intermarriages, often love marriages between different castes, lin-
guistic groups and, to a certain extent, religious groups, indicate a gradual shift of 
group boundaries; there are very few instances of caste or communal violence (cf. 
Tamta, 1991, p.120); caste discrimination based on ritual purity is generally absent in 
everyday interactions of people from different linguistic backgrounds; however, it 
might occur within some recently migrated groups coming from particular mainland 
settings, which have been able to reproduce a diasporic model of caste, jati or gotra, 
from their place; in general public, people from various social and cultural back-
grounds mingle with each other, in professional as well as in private matters.  
The local way of creating unity can be seen as result of speaking a common vernacular, 
too. For effective communication, every migrant, hailing from one of the multiple lin-
guistic backgrounds present in the islands, has to adopt the colonial lingua franca: An-
daman Hindustani, a colloquial type of Urdu that – in tune with the all-embracing na-
tionalist unification – is often termed as Hindi. Even Tamils, who are known for their 
                       
8 A community in the Andamans can be defined in various and overlapping ways: by religious denomination or sect, 
by ethnicity, caste, class, gender, language or even by certain common experiences related to the migration experi-
ence. Institutional channels for membership in such communities are political parties, NGOs (especially language 
associations), unions, communities defined by sentiment or by practice (such as Tsunami-affected farmers), and 
religious groups such as temple committees, Haj associations or the various churches. While Andaman communi-
ties have been formed due to a large variety of identifications, in this paper, I am going to confine myself on com-
munities defined by categories of settlement, language and an imagined ethnicity. 
9 Most Andaman people have to engage with the system in a pragmatic way, as the state provides the majority of 
capital and employment. Compared to the Indian mainland, the population enjoys a high standard of life. This is a 
result of huge annual plan outlays, which are spent for defence establishments, administration, labour, develop-
ment projects, and for the supply of the population with subsidized consumer goods.  
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political aversion against the hegemony of Hindi, regularly learn it. Andaman Hindu-
stani is spoken in a large variety of tongues according to the linguistic context of each 
speaker. There are constant adaptations from other vernaculars, e.g. from the fash-
ionable 'Bombay Hindi', as many youngsters emphasize. While change and transfor-
mation have been constant features of linguistic diversity in the islands, the adoption 
of a lingua franca has also contributed to the formation of local identification and be-
longing. 
Based on what I have described, I do not deny the efficacy of the local version of na-
tionalist integration. My stance is, rather, to critically examine Mini-India as projected 
model of multi-culturalism. This involves questioning its taken-for-granted status as 
signifier of communal harmony. There is a 'flip side of the coin': during my fieldwork 
on political negotiations of Otherness in the local migration discourse, I encountered 
multiple forms of conflict lurking beneath the surface. I want to highlight this more 
conflict-laden, politically charged aspect of Mini-India. 
While migration to the Andamans was conducive to create an Indian 'model' diaspora 
of creolized overseas communities, the very model of multi-culturalism led to political 
conflict between these communities. In sharp contrast to public representations of 
Mini-India, I have found intense political competition between communities. These 
lines of communal divide are formed on the basis of essentialized difference.  
I wondered if this phenomenon can be understood by looking at the political relation-
ship between the state and identified communities through which welfare policies are 
channelled.10 The local welfare regime is, indeed, tied to community politics. Voice 
and political demands for sinecures are formulated through powerful patrons. The 
strength of the patrons depends, among others, on their number of supporters, their 
so-called “vote bank”.  
One of the most obvious examples of such political conflict is the discourse of migra-
tion itself: continuous population growth and increasing social complexity in the last 
decades has led many to worry about the economic and ecological balance of the is-
lands. People, who consider themselves to be locals or islanders, have stimulated neg-
ative views about migration in public; by pointing to threats of overpopulation, they 
have pressurized the administration to stop further migration to the Andamans.  
This article aims at highlighting the politicization of community. I am, therefore, asking 
for particular consequences of historical migration processes on the formation of 
communities. What kind of attachment to the place have they developed and how are 
these forms of belonging articulated and performed in politics? To answer these ques-
tions, I will refer to ethnographic data collected in Port Blair, the only town of the An-
damans, and in rural areas between 2006 and 2012.11    
In the following, first part of my paper, I will depict the history of the Andaman regime 
of migration and the social engineering policies that led to the crystallization of dis-
tinct communities in Mini-India. Political competition, which emerged in the migration 
                       
10 Competition for funds and status between different groups, and the resolving of conflicts in the political arena, 
can be regarded as characteristic of South Asian politics and peoples' appropriation of democracy (Spencer, 2007). 
11 I have to point out that my research on the topic has, to a large extent, been influenced by male interlocutors 
and their gendered perspectives on politics. Women's voices, especially those in a subaltern position, were often 
suppressed by male claims on universal representative status.      
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process, will be the topic of the second part. I will exemplify relevant aspects of reifi-
cation of community by pointing to a contemporary conflict about reservation policies. 
In the final, third part, I will highlight the problematization of the very discourse of 
migration and subsequent implications for state policies. 
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1. History of the Andaman Regime of Migration 
 
Colonial and postcolonial forms of managing migration have continued to shape mate-
rial and discursive frameworks of subjectivation. The Andaman regime of migration 
has to be analysed by taking into account broader socio-economic and historic condi-
tions. For the sake of analysis, the regime can be divided in a twofold manner: first, 
state-directed policies of planned population movement; second, independent migra-
tions occurring without administrative planning.   
Both the British (1858-1942) and the postcolonial Indian state have applied overlap-
ping technologies of power and knowledge. Social engineering implied the shaping of 
a new and 'better' society through population movement. Transport and rehabilitation 
of 'problem populations', such as convicts or refugees, served to ameliorate 'receiving' 
as well as 'sending' contexts (cf. Sen, S., 2000). Here, subalternity12, appears both as 
precondition for the transportation of populations as well as their continuous domina-
tion in the island colony. 
In addition to that, there has been an independent, 'self-motivated' population 
movement to and from the islands since the early years of colonization. The urge to 
'develop' the colony's infrastructure, and to enhance its institutionalization, has at-
tracted labourers, adventurers, scientists, entrepreneurial traders, soldiers, and white-
collar as well as blue-collar government servants.13  
Due to these two different types of migration, state-directed and independent, partic-
ular property relations and specific divisions of labour developed. This has had conse-
quences for the cohabitation and interaction of communities. In the following, I am 
going to describe the ideological and material premises that have shaped the Anda-
man regime of migration and the subsequent emergence of communities. 
 
Forced labour migration - the foundation of the 'local-born' community  
 
After the Mutiny/ Rebellion of 1857, delinquents from all over India and Burma were 
transported overseas to the Andaman penal settlement at Port Blair.14 The diversity of 
convicts posed a significant problem for the administration. There was a constant urge 
to classify the subalterns in order to know and discipline them.15 As soon as the con-
                       
12 I define subalternity as a relationship of subordination as well as physical and epistemic violence, experienced by 
marginal groups  in the modern state – women, children, peasants, indigenous people, daily wage labourers, refu-
gees, et cetera. However, the condition subalternity cannot be applied on everyone belonging to the 'lower-class' 
section. Being subaltern is characteristic of not 'speaking' and, thus, of not being 'listened' to within dominant 
frameworks of representation (Spivak, 2008). This lack of articulated voice inhibits socio-economic mobility of 
subalterns, but it does not necessarily fix subaltern subjectivity for ever: many examples from the Andamans 
demonstrate, how the descendants of former convicts or refugees have entered the higher echelons of civil society.     
13 Apart from searching employment, each migrant had multiple other reasons to come to the Andamans; e.g. 
adventure, love, friendship, evasion from state or kin, land grabbing, religious conversion, etc. This multitude of 
motivations serves to transcend simplistic conceptualizations of migration, which are prevalent in classical migra-
tion studies applying mechanistic push-and-pull factors. 
14 In 1904, the German scientist Gustav Fritsch came to the Andamans to study the convicts’ physiognomy. He 
called the penal colony a “laboratory of Indian humankind”, because the convicts represented such a diversity of 
races, castes, religions, and classes of India (Anderson, 2004, p.199). 
15 The British attempted to order the obscure life-worlds of the colonized with their hardly classifiable multiple 
belongings through administrative classifications of collective group identity in the 'ethnographic state' (Dirks, 
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victs had arrived on the islands, the administration took over the management of their 
religious and social activities (Mukhopadhyay, K., 2002, p.10). 
Convict labour was primarily utilized to dry swamps and cut forests, and to develop 
the infrastructure in order to ease the colonization. The penal colony was established 
out of strategic and punitive considerations.16 A rehabilitation scheme was set up that 
allowed loyal convicts to settle down with their mainland families as free, self-
supporting colonists at the end of their term (ibid., p.27). To create families for the 
permanent settlement of the colony, the British encouraged self-supporters to marry 
convict women, too (Sen, S. 2004, p.261).  
In these weddings, less emphasis was laid on the observance of rigid rules of engage-
ment from the mainland. Spouse and groom just had to be from the same denomina-
tion (Temple, 1909, p.67). There was an attempt to reconstruct caste amongst 'Hin-
dus' after 1884 (Sen, S. 2004, p.279); however, as suitable matches in the same jati 
were regularly lacking, inter-caste marriages became common. Facing less social con-
trol through extended family networks, sometimes even inter-religious marriages 
were arranged. The offspring of these often caste and language barriers transcending 
unions was classified as 'local-born' community by the administration.  
In the following decades, many ‘local-born’ raised their socio-economic status through 
education and employment in the administration (Dhingra, 2005, p.163). Descendants 
of older generations of local-born have confirmed that, due to spatial distance to their 
kin on the mainland, the importance of caste status and ritual purity has weakened. 
Contemporary self-representations of the 'local-born' community emphasize that they 
had developed a caste-less society.17  
Because of their appropriation of various cultural elements from the convicts' contexts 
of origin, their community has also been conceptualized as cosmopolitan “creole cul-
ture” (Ghosal, 2001, p.206).  The local-borns' approach of encompassing cultural dif-
ference and Otherness expresses a core value of the contemporary Andaman society 
or Mini-India; for example, people from different confessions regularly take part in 
each others' religious festivals (Tamta, 1991, p.120). Initially, the term Mini-India was 
applied to this particular hybrid community. Later, the ascription, along with its con-
                                                                
2001). This led to the gradual reification of community identifications, as these were fixed in the process of 
knowledge production. The classificatory differentiation of separate, bounded castes and their politicization con-
tinues to haunt postcolonial relations of power and knowledge. These categorizations can be regarded as an out-
standing example of the postcolonial legacy of colonial governance. 
16 Regarding the purpose of setting up a colony in the Andamans, differing priorities were identified by historians. 
Satadru Sen's “Disciplining Punishment” (2000) rests on a Foucauldian argument that the institutionalization of the 
penal settlement had the primary purpose to isolate, punish, survey, rehabilitate and reform subversive or 'crimi-
nal' convicts from the Indian mainland. In “Imperial Andamans” (2010), Aparna Vaidik accuses Sen of neglecting the 
spatial and geographical dimensions of insularity. She states that “[t]he establishment of the penal settlement (...) 
was only a mode of colonization and not the actual objective as it has come to be represented by historians.” 
(Vaidik 2010, p.36). According to Vaidik, the primary motive for the colonization was to gain control over the Bay of 
Bengal (ibid, p.6).  
17 Such statements about the absence of caste are paradoxical for several reasons: in the light of reservation poli-
tics, these utterances have to be interpreted as politically motivated representations of internal unity; however, 
there is an empirical absence of discrimination on the basis of purity rules. Most local-borns have, indeed, only 
vague ideas about their caste backgrounds (Mukhopadhyay, K., 2002, p.19). Further, there is lack of conceptual 
clarity in local parlance; caste is often interchangeably used as a synonym for either ethnic community, religious 
denomination, category of settlement, or, in its more original sense of indicating hierarchy, as varna, jati or gotra.  
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notations of modernity and secularism, has been extended to the whole Andaman 
society.  
 
Migrations after 1920 – from convict to contract labour 
 
Sustenance and sustainability have continued to be exigent issues of island policy. 
Since the opening of the settlement, the administration had to uphold the chain of 
food supply and all other necessary amendments of ‘civilized life’; rations, transport of 
passengers and convicts, and communication were regularly provided by overseas 
shipping (Vaidik, 2010, p.63-4). Expenses multiplied due to steady arrivals of convicts 
and the crystallization of the local-born population.18    
Poor climatic conditions, high expenses, and the dependence on imports urged the 
administration to reconsider their settlement policy in the 1920s. They considered to 
close down the penal settlement at Port Blair and to develop into a free colony (An-
derson, 2008, p.5; Mukhopahyay, K. 2002, p.8). Additionally, the realization that the 
effect of transportation of 'criminal classes' was not as deterrent as expected, led to 
the emergence of a new policy that laid more emphasis on agricultural development 
(cf. Tamta, 1991, p.69). Commercial farming and plantations were to replenish self-
supporting farming activities and, thus, to ensure self-sufficiency (cf. Dhingra, 2005, 
p.71). 
One distinct outcome of this policy change was the settlement of two criminalized 
groups of subalterns as self-supporters: the Bhantu, a 'criminal tribe' from North India, 
and the Moplah, rebels from the Malabar coast. Both groups were not split up like the 
previous convicts in the settlement. Instead, they were settled in isolated spaces of 
jungle, far away from the villages and stations of the penal settlement (Coomar, 1997, 
p.23; Dhingra, 2005, p.161; Mukhopadhyay, K., 2002, p.8). This served to avoid poten-
tial menace to the well-maintained order of the colony, which these rebellious and 
'criminal' groups were thought to cause through insubordinate behaviour.19 
Moreover, the development of new plots of agricultural land coincided with a desire 
to stretch the geographical boundaries of the colony. An increase of surplus produc-
tion could only be realised through the clearing of forest land. This ‘settler colonialist’ 
policy of stretching the frontier into ‘virgin’ forest was combined with the expanse of 
commercial forestry. The exploitation and export of high-valuable timber like the en-
demic Padauk, Teak and other hard-wood species was to provide a source of income.  
Timber exploitation in tropical rain forests required labourers, who were deemed fit 
for this purpose. That's why the Karen, an ethnic group from Burma, and other Bur-
mese labourers,20 were brought in by the government. Burmese labourers, including 
                       
18 Total population increase between 1874: 9,217 and 1901: 16,101 (Census report for 1901, R.C.C Temple Collec-
tion, MSS Eur/F 98, no.42, IOR, cited in: Vaidik, 2010, p.67) 
19 Due to their separate settlement, both Bhantu and Moplah were able to preserve and reconstruct a large variety 
of traditions from their places on the subcontinent. This, in turn, has led to heightened identifications with their 
diasporic communities. In the contemporary social substratum of the Andamans, they are regarded as independent 
communities that have established in addition to the local-born community. 
20 Many Burmese were recruited for the “Bush Police“. They had to fight the indigenous Jarawas and track down 
escaped convicts (Dhingra, 2005, p.161). People also told me that many Burmese were artisans and wage labourers 
in colonial Port Blair. After the independence of Burma, the majority of Andaman Burmese was 'repatriated'. 
1. History of the Andaman Regime of Migration 
 9 
Karen, were assumed to cope better with the humid, tropical climate because of the 
geographical proximity of the Andamans to Burma (Dass, 2001, p.108). 
From 1918 onwards, indigenous labourers from the Chotanagpur plateau in Middle 
India were recruited as coolies by the Catholic Labour Bureau in the city of Ranchi. 
Their subalternity can be  regarded as precondition for the physical exploitation of 
their labour power by the recruiters and the Andaman authorities; the example of 
their 'ethnic' naming, however, demonstrates how they were subjected to epistemic 
violence, too: Instead of enumerating and recognizing a large variety of Adivasi la-
bourers according to their belonging to groups such as Oraon, Munda, Kharia, all of 
them  have been subsumed under one category, referring to their place of recruit-
ment: they have been called 'Ranchis' or ‘Ranchiwallahs’ (Mukerji, 1992, p.113).  
Most circulating labourers and many free settlers, who had a place on the mainland to 
return to, left the islands before the Japanese occupied them in World War II (1942-
45). Only those groups, who had collectively stayed back during the occupation, i.e. 
the local-born, Bhantu, Moplah and Karen, were later recognized as ‘pre-42’ commu-
nities (Mukhopadhyay, K., 2002, p.18). Pre-42 is a specific category of settlement that 
denotes contemporary descendants of colonial inhabitants. It indicates, therefore, a 
certain, periodical sense of time, which implies a sense of place, too. This attachment 
to the islands has become a marker of differentiation from postcolonial settlers and 
migrants.  
 
Rehabilitation and Colonization Settlement 
 
After independence, the dominant perception of the Andamans was that vast spaces 
of dense tropical forest were 'terra nullius'. Due to the steady numerical decline of 
indigenous people, these lowly populated jungles were thought of being suited for 
colonization (Sen, U., 2011, p.223). They appeared apt for the settlement of Bengali 
‘Hindu’ refugees.21 The decision to settle the island territory was decisively influenced 
by larger strategic considerations. The distribution of citizens in the name of the re-
cently founded nation state into low-populated, marginal regions was to prevent in-
ternal political instabilities and invasions of neighbouring countries.  
The colonial “garbage dump” policy, the deportation and settlement of problem popu-
lations (Sen, S., 2000, p. 53), was, therefore, continued by the postcolonial Andaman 
administration. Emulating its predecessor, the policy not only served to increase the 
governance of the mainland by removing landless people, squatters, refugees, and 
other categories of uncontrollable subalterns to the former penal colony, where they 
were rehabilitated as sedentary farmers; this massive state-directed population 
movement also had the aim to rejuvenate the older colonial project of attaining self-
sufficiency in terms of agricultural production (cf. Dhingra, 2005, p.187; Mukhopadhay, 
K., 2002, p.15; Venkateswar, 2004, p.126).  
                       
21 These had come to India after their exodus from East Bengal, the newly declared East Pakistan. To a large extent, 
the refugees had moved to Kolkata and other cities of West Bengal (cf. Chatterjee, 2006, p.54). Because many of 
them had squatted available public spaces in and around cities, they were perceived as a ‘threat’ to public order. In 
later years, the continued violence between Singhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka had caused an increase of refugees 
in India, too. The Andamans were seen as a bastion to bring these refugees (Venkateswar, 2004, p.153, Footnote 8). 
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Thus, between 1949 and 1978, under so called rehabilitation and colonization 
schemes, all together 4531 families were settled on cleared plots of jungle (Dhingra, 
2005, p.167). Most families were provided with either ten or five acres of hilly and 
paddy land, supplied with food items and timber, pesticides, a buffalo, and/or a milk 
cow plus some cash (Mathur, 1985, p.266). More than 86% of these families were 
Bengali refugees (Biswas, 2010, p.90).  
Apart from that, landless communities, like Malayalis from Kerala, and Ranchi labour-
ers from Middle India, were rehabilitated. Further, Tamil Sri Lankan repatriates, and 
Telugu as well as Tamil repatriates from Burma, came to the islands under the same 
schemes. These non-Bengali families were probably brought in by the government as 
a reaction to protests of the local-born community. The old inhabitants, who were in 
control of political power, had fears that a Bengali majority might overpower them 
(ibid., p. 89-90).    
Influenced by secular and egalitarian concepts of the Nehruvian welfare state, rehabil-
itation functioned as a social upliftment policy for the previously deprived settlers. In 
the beginning, they were cast as agricultural pioneers that colonized the frontier (Sen, 
U., 2011, p.222). While agriculture had been the main source of livelihood for the first 
generation of settlers, many of their descendants in the second and third generation 
have become government servants (cf. Paul, 1994, p.44; Biswas, 2010, p.147-8). This 
has reduced their economic dependency on agriculture and, therefore, their willing-
ness to cultivate the land. Nonetheless, being a land-owner turned out to be a crucial 
advantage for many settlers. Later coming migrants in their neighbourhoods had to 
lease or buy land from them. I have observed that some migrants even acted as share-
croppers of settlers (Paul, 1994, p.43-44). In this 'neo-zamindari' system, a certain 




Parallel to the state-directed settlement of people, an independent movement of 
people to and from the Andamans has always existed. These migrants – soldiers, ad-
ministrators, servants, labourers, traders, teachers, fishermen etc. – have  come either 
temporarily, as circulating labour, or they have settled down permanently. Privileged 
migrants have always been white-collar government servants. Most of them were 
from Kerala and West Bengal (Mukhopadhyay, 2002, p.16). Many had been attracted 
from the mainland with raised salaries. While the majority of educated white-collar 
migrants returned to the mainland after some years of service, a considerable number 
has taken up permanent residence in the islands, too. 
In the decades after independence, objectives of development in the Andamans re-
sembled the colonial focus on agricultural development and a timber-based industry 
(cf. Mukhopadhyay, C., 2002, p.30). A large number of government servants and la-
bourers was needed to provide the development of infrastructure. Possibilities of pri-
vate employment were generated in fisheries and the evolving service and trade sec-
tor. 
In order to clear plots for the rehabilitation settlements in the remote forest areas of 
South, Middle, North and Little Andaman, there was a demand for specialized forest 
labour. Since convict labour was no longer available, a new labour recruitment scheme 
1. History of the Andaman Regime of Migration 
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had to be set up (ANI Administration, 1976, p.149). In continuity with colonial 
schemes, the administration hired many Ranchi labourers from the Chotanagpur re-
gion to work on a contract basis. Several officials have confirmed to me that as Adiva-
sis, as indigenous people of India, they were assumed to be racially fit for this kind of 
labour. Their 'aboriginality' and 'primitiveness' have both served as the main explana-
tion for their 'docility' and 'hard-working' character (cf. Ghosh, 1999).22  
Additionally, there was a demand for workers in the timber industry, in large-scale 
infrastructure projects, and in the domestic sector. Chatham saw mill, one of the big-
gest in Asia at that time, was especially in need of man power. Therefore, contractors 
mainly brought labourers from Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Ranchi (Dhingra, 
2005, p.254). Until now, labour migration has been organized by subcontractors, who 
work for larger contractors that often take over infrastructure development projects 
from the administration. These subcontractors go to respective villages on the main-
land and bring whole groups of precarious, but able-bodied, labourers to the An-
damans.23  
Common to all migrants is that they were not given land under rehabilitation or colo-
nization schemes, even if they were employed with the government. In general, mi-
grants were not regarded as potential settlers by the administration. They were re-
peatedly termed as “floating population” (cf. ANI Administration, 1976, p.150), imply-
ing that a 'reserve army' of circulating migrants is willing to sell their labour power 
without establishing personal relationships or attachments to the place.24  
Based on ideological conceptualizations of cultural 'rootedness' of communities, it has 
been expected that migrants were keen to return to the mainland after their contract 
terms had expired. Assumptions that people 'naturally' want to return to a definite 
place of 'origin', defined by kinship and territoriality, have continued to shape the mi-
gration, employment and development policies in the Andamans for several dec-
ades.25 It has led officials to ignore the fact that migrants have continuously taken up 
residence in the islands.26  
                       
22 This has determined the relationship with their employers and the larger society, which can be described as one 
of subalternity. Their discrimination as 'junglees' has contributed to their continuous social and political marginali-
sation in the island society. In spite of their major contributions to the process of colonization and rehabilitation 
through clearing of forests and infrastructure development, there were only 197 families rehabilitated as reward 
for their compliance with the Forest Department (Statistical Outline of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 1962, cited in: 
Dhingra, 2005, p.83). As many other Ranchis have not been provided with land to settle down, they have either 
leased or bought land from settlers. Most have encroached forest land for building houses and gardens, often near 
their previous places of work. Ranchis, as a community, lack powerful political support that articulates their voice. 
Not much has been done for peoples' welfare on encroachments of forest land: schools do function only partially, 
whereas primary health centres, electricity, and infrastructure are absent. It has been assumed that “they are 
tribals, and quite happy in the forest.” (Saldhana, 1989, p.14). 
23 Due to post-Tsunami rehabilitation funds and the general economic growth, the demand for cheap labour in the 
construction business has increased in the last years. Contractors have always employed the most precarious and, 
thus, cheapest labour power. Most of the present contracted labour has come from rural West Bengal. Confirming 
local rumours, one subcontractor told me that he had transported illegalized Bangladeshis, who had crossed the 
border to West Bengal. 
24 Many studies about migrant labour in India stress the aspect of circulation as its main characteristic (Breman, 
1996; Gidwani/ Sivaramakrishnan, 2004). While I acknowledge the validity of these approaches, my study is locally 
confined to the Andamans as place of departure and arrival of people. 
25 Ranchis, for example have always been regarded as circulating labour force. While many, indeed, used to return 
to the mainland after their tasks were completed, lots of them have decided to stay back and bring their families, 
too. A considerable number has encroached forest or revenue land to build houses and gardens. The second or 
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The contrary of these assumptions has manifested: over the decades, the Andamans 
have come to be known as a place of various opportunities with large chunks of' 'free' 
land (Mukherjee, 2002, p.74).27 After dropping out of their contracts, many labourers 
have decided to stay in the islands. Decisive factors have been established networks of 
friendship and kinship, good employment opportunities, a comparatively high level of 
income and a good quality of life (cf. Dhingra, 2005, p.102). Local interlocutors, who 
had migrated themselves, told me in retrospective that they had needed several years 
to establish in the upwardly mobile local society. This social advancement has led 
them to refuse to do low-paid manual labour any more. As a result, contractors have 
constantly brought in new labourers. 
People often moved with their families through networks of chain migration on estab-
lished routes from different places; e.g., a considerable number of Andaman fisher-
men came from particular villages in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh 
(Mukhopadhyay, K., 2002, p.24). While some migrants have lost contact to their fami-
lies on the mainland, the majority has maintained personal links to their muluk, or 
native place; even if they have settled down permanently in the Andamans, they con-
tinue to visit their villages once a year, or, at least, once a decade.28  
Others live in the islands only for certain periods of a year; e.g., for seasonal work in 
tourism or construction, until they return and come back again. Marital alliances are 
forged to connect the multiple dimensions of place attachment, too. Circular popula-
tion movement and multiple forms of belonging distinguish migrants from settlers and 
pre-42 inhabitants; the pre-42 and most settlers define themselves through their be-
longing to the Andamans. 
                                                                
third generation now lives on these lands. Most of them have never gone to mainland. They identify themselves as 
locals.  
26 This parallels conceptualizations of migration in other parts of the world; e.g., as late as 1998, after several dec-
ades of mass migration, the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) was finally declared as “immigration country”.  
27 A young owner of an Internet Cafe in Kolkata, who had no personal relationship to the Andamans, told me: “In 
school, when someone was not good in studying, our teacher made the joke: If you are not successful in school, go 
to Andaman. There you will get land and everything you need from the government for free. Keti karo, Khana khao! 
[PZ: Make agriculture and eat your food!].   
28 A good example of these transregional connections are trader families from Tamil Nadu. Until today, many fami-
lies have been able to uphold their connections to the Indian mainland through regular business and holiday visits, 
the forging of marriage alliances and the 'import' of rituals and festivals. One of my interlocutors belonged to an 
influential Tamil business family from Chennai, where had married within his caste. In colonial times, his ancestors 
had come to the Andaman penal settlement to supply the population with consumer goods. Since then, his family 
has dominated certain segments of trade to and from the islands. As confirmation of their influence and status, he 
told me that in 1967, his family even managed to bring 'their' Murugan temple to Port Blair from Chennai. [PZ: of 
course, they did not bring the whole temple, but only the murti, the statue of the God Murugan!] 
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2. Island Multi-Culturalism and the Politics of   
Community 
 
The politicization of community in the islands is closely intertwined with categories of 
settlement that I have described above; migration policies and processes of place-
making have contributed to the crystallization of several separate communities: Local-
born, Bhantus, Moplahs, Karen, Bengalis, Malayalis, Tamils, Telugus, Ranchis, Punjabis, 
Marathis, et cetera.29 There are, of course, internal divisions within the communi-
ties.30 The migration from a locality in the Indian mainland, from a particular village, 
district or state, functions here as a political identification, a creation of Selves versus 
Others.31    
For Andaman people, the community form has become the primary mode to articu-
late voice vis-a-vis the administration. This voice is most often not directly articulated 
by subalterns themselves. Subalterns rarely speak for themselves within established 
frameworks of political representation (cf. Spivak, 2008). Instead, they depend on ar-
ticulate, and, therefore, educated and well-connected leaders, who know how to 
speak the language of power. These are civil society actors like ex-government serv-
ants, religious leaders, businessmen, media persons, NGO employees, politicians, and 
so called 'social workers'. Their role as intermediaries is to articulate voice for numeri-
cally large groups of their subaltern 'clients' in public, especially towards those who 
govern. Their claim to directly represent a strategically unified and decisive subaltern 
voice serves to underline their political efficacy as 'voice-givers'. This particular way of 
voicing demands through community leaders can be regarded as functional element 
of a welfare regime that is based on ethnically framed participation.   
 
The Politics of Ethnicity 
 
Contrary to the harmonizing ideal of Mini-India, local welfare policies have become 
entangled with the local discourse of multi-culturalism. In the following, I am going to 
demonstrate how the practice of distributing welfare, and of recruiting government 
servants according to categories of community, has created political conflict in the 
                       
29 In the Census 1991, the main languages spoken in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were enumerated as follows: 
Bengali (64.706), Tamil (53.356), Hindi/Hindustani/Urdu (50.961) Telugu (32,979), Nicobari (26.142), Malayalam 
(26,075), Kurukh/Oraon (9253) (Directorate of Statistics, Port Blair, cited in: Dhingra, 2005, p.168) 
30 The often class-transcending, categorical mingling of subaltern wage labourers, white- and blue-collar employees, 
and the bourgeoisie in separate ethnic 'containers', leads to a political division of those who might otherwise have 
common class interests. 
31 It is important to mention that I do not assume any primordial attachment of migrants to one of these groups. 
Instead, I regard subjectivities as products of genealogies of power and knowledge. Subjects are capable to choose 
between one or several of these different politicized forms of community, in which she or he is often already em-
bedded through life history. I argue, therefore, that belonging to a community is part of a political identification 
that encompasses other forms of 'traditional' loyalty and solidarity from the 'sending' contexts such as jati, gotra, 
family affiliation, et cetera. While the latter are often reconstructed as a part of the process of place-making, com-
munity identifications can be regarded as products of the specific cultural “theatre” of local politics (cf. Amit/ Rap-
port 2002, p.7-8). 'The cultural' appears here as a permanent battlefield in the fight for recognition of position and 
status. It can even transform into a 'culturalism', when “ethnicities mobilized by or in relation to the practices of 
the modern nation state...take cultural differences as their conscious object” (Appadurai, 1996, p.146-7).  
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island society: community leaders aim to strategically appropriate provisions of wel-
fare; they do this by instrumentalizing the discourse of ethnic difference and same-
ness; community itself has, therefore, become the first and foremost vehicle of such 
conflict. 
Local-born civil society actors, for example, identify themselves as local Andaman In-
dians in opposition to mainland migrants. One local-born gave me a clear definition of 
how he imagines ethnicity: ”What makes the identity of an ethnic group? A common 
history, a common descent, a common language, and a common culture. That’s what 
we have!” 
Similar processes of ethnic identification can be observed among the other two cate-
gories of settlement, the rehabilitated settlers and the independent migrants. Political 
leaders have tried to include new migrants from their respective states, who often 
came through networks of chain migration, in their 'vote bank'. This emphasis on 
commonalities, like a vernacular, or the sharing of an imagined 'culture' and history, 
contributed to the forging of diasporic communities. As a result, in the contemporary 
island society, collective self-representations vis-a-vis others who do not belong to 
one's own vernacular group are predominantly framed in such broadly defined cultur-
al identifications.32  
The production of Self and Other is accompanied by the ascription of certain stereo-
types to each community. My interlocutors often emphasized primordial and homo-
geneous forms of belonging to a particular community. Especially, when they emulat-
ed political rhetoric, I could not take them at face value; they attached specific racial, 
social, and cultural stereotypes to certain ethnicities and furnished with positive or 
negative qualities: Malayalis, for example, who are often employed as clerks, are said 
to be educated, but also deceitful. Tamils, who dominate business and trade, are ste-
reotyped to be arduous, but also scrupulous. The local-born are depicted as 'criminals' 
because of their convict ancestors. Bengalis are said to have an affinity for politics, and 
a love for arts, but are assumed to be lazy. On the contrary, Ranchis, who are mostly 
landless labourers living on encroachments, are seen as hard-working, docile, and 
submissive. Due to their indigeneity, they are continuously represented as backward, 
primitive and dumb, too. 
Many of these clichés go back to historical divisions of labour and modes of produc-
tion in the mainland. These have been reproduced and appropriated to the local con-
text. Such objectifying representations can be regarded as strategic forms of essential-
ization.33 They have to be interpreted as conscious strategies of 'position-making' in a 
multi-cultural system of political competition. 
                       
32 Apart from the social imaginary of diasporic solidarity, these groups are internally divided into different castes, 
classes, sects, and religions; e.g., two Tamils from different castes might structure their interaction according to 
reconstructed rules from the mainland. Nevertheless, if claims have to be made via the administration or other 
ethnic groups, they will strategically assume a diasporic unity as Tamils – as imagined community based on a com-
mon language and 'culture'. On the contrary, a Bengali, who does not know the specific caste names and back-
grounds of both Tamils, will not be able to differentiate them without getting to know them better. For him, both 
will be first and foremost Tamils, or Madrasis. Vice-versa, both Tamils will not necessarily know that a Bengali 
named Ram Mandal is from the Namasudra caste. Instead, she or he will just be a Bengali for them (cf. Paul, 1994, 
p.30). 
33 I have appropriated Spivak's contention that the Subaltern Studies Collective did strategically essentialize the 
subaltern in a "scrupulously visible political interest" for my own argument (Spivak 1988: 15). Here, I am ascribing 
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The most important institutions for processes of ethnic identification have been asso-
ciations of language groups: the Ranchi association, the Local-Born Association, the 
Andhra Association, the Tamizhar Sangam, the Bengali Association, the Kerala Sa-
majham, et cetera. I interviewed influential spokespersons of all these associations. 
The majority of them emphasized that the associations were formed in order to pro-
mote specific language education, to reconstruct (mainland) tradition and culture, and, 
to take over an intermediary function between the people of each language group and 
the administration or even the government. This form of patronage could be provided 
for an individual's court case, or for collective aims like the reservation of quota in the 
education system. The Andhra Association, for example, has negotiated with the An-
dhra Pradesh government about the reservation of seats for Andaman-based, but 
'ethnic' Telugu students.  
Furthermore, even if formally defined as non-political organizations, some associa-
tions have become vehicles of electoral mobilisation. The general secretary of one 
important association told me that he had dealt out an alliance with a party candidate 
and religious leaders before the last parliamentary elections. They were to commonly 
support the candidate in order to help him getting elected as sole local member of 
parliament. The deal included a promise to mobilize the particular 'ethnic' electorate 
to vote for the candidate in exchange for future political support of the community. 
One of the demands was quota reservation under a particular category. 
Party politics are also dominated by ethnic mobilization. Many party politicians seem 
to have their own ethnic networks of patronage and clientelism organized on the basis 
of community. There are, thus, not only branches of the big national parties, Congress 
and BJP, but also a variety of regional parties such as the Tamilian DMK, the Trinamool 
Congress from West Bengal, the Telugu Desam Party from Andhra Pradesh, the Jhar-
khand Mukti Morcha, et cetera.  
In general, voters don't seem to be attached to party ideology or a specific election 
program; especially in municipal and local government (Panchayat) elections, they are 
much more focused on a specific personality of a candidate or patron, who is able to 
give a voice to their demands. During the 1985 elections for the Port Blair municipal 
council, for example, the Telugu Desam Party won one seat with 81.58% of votes 
(Biswas, 2002, p.101). This was due to active support of Telugu people in the ward, 
where this community had a majority of voters (ibid., p.96). When I was talking with 
voters about their party affiliation before the last national parliamentary elections, 
many displayed their dislike or appreciation of a particular Member of Parliament (MP) 
candidate. They disliked him, because they supposed that, as a Bengali, his 'natural' 
inclination will be to support his Bengali vote bank. They emphasized that, after being 
elected, each candidate would primarily take interest in the betterment of his own 
community. 
The Bengalis as biggest community in the Andamans are said to heavily influence local 
politics. In the last three decades, every elected MP was a Bengali. That's why people 
from other communities often blame the former Bengali MP, who was in power for 
several decades, to have facilitated the migration and settlement of Bengalis in the 
                                                                
the political strategy of essentialization to community actors who represent 'their' own as well as other communi-
ties with objectified/ reified/ essentialized stereotypes in order to take political advantage.  
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Andamans in order to increase his vote bank. The electoral dominance of Bengalis also 
had crucial influence on the introduction of Other Backward Classes (OBC) quotas in 
the Andamans. This example demonstrates the inextricable entanglement of commu-
nities' articulation of political voice and their access to sinecures. 
                
The Struggle for OBC  
 
An official notification released by the administration on 12th December 2005 de-
clared the introduction of quota reservation under the Other Backward Classes (OBC) 
scheme: 38% of government service posts and of seats in higher education have been 
reserved for identified backward communities.34 This had an outstanding influence on 
the politicization of community in the Andamans. The introduction of OBC marked an 
explicit turn away from official policies that had hitherto declared equality and same-
ness in secular Mini-India as guiding principles of its cosmopolitan society. 
Many interlocutors claimed that such reservation policy has never been necessary 
because there has never been religious or caste discrimination. Some 'local-born' have 
been more satisfied with the older system. They have complained that this decision 
would not only symbolically undermine the absence of a caste system in the islands; it 
would also lead to casteism, because other communities started to represent to be 
backward and discriminated in order to get reservation. Nonetheless, there has been 
reservation, and thus, 'positive discrimination' before the introduction of OBC.35 The 
only difference was that it has not been given on the basis of community, but accord-
ing to a hierarchy of categories of settlement.36   
Only five communities, distinguished on the basis of their migration and settlement, 
were declared as OBC: the rehabilitated Bengali settlers, as well as the 'local-born', 
Bhantu, Karen and Moplah, who according to political context, can act loyally as 'pre-
42', or as separate communities. This decision was based on recommendations of an 
OBC Commission that had reviewed social and economic conditions of various island 
                       
34 For decades, Indian (federal) states have practised quota reservation of seats in higher education, and of jobs in 
the state apparatus; for example, in the police or in clerical employment. The intention has been to uplift discrimi-
nated and deprived communities. Since then, quota reservation has been probably the most decisive vehicle for 
class mobility. In independent India, naukri, state employment or service, is often a direct result of getting seats in 
higher educational institutions. Naukri, thus, can be regarded as one important means of upwards mobility. It is not 
only connected with social security in the form of proper salary and pensions, but also with access to the state 
machinery and its funds. 
35 The administration, as opposed to central government institutions, has had its own approved guidelines of ad-
mission to higher education and clerical jobs; accordingly, bona fide holders of specific 'local certificates' were 
eligible to get 88% of government jobs under the local administration, while 12% was reserved for the indigenous 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) (Biswas, 2010, p.132). This reservation practice is still continued by most local institutions, as, 
for example, the polytechnic. It is based on a hierarchy of classifications defined by the duration of settlement. 
36 If two candidates from different communities are applying for the same job or educational seat, preference will 
be given to that candidate, who is able to produce a certificate that proves a certain category of settlement: the 
first category comprises 'old inhabitants' or 'pre-42', the second were 'settlers', i.e. all communities settled by the 
state under rehabilitation and colonization schemes. The third group classified was '10-years category'; i.e. all 
people, regardless from where they migrated, who were not settled under any scheme; however, it is mandatory 
for that category to have visited a school in the islands for at least 10 years. Finally, there were 'others', all migrants, 
who could not produce any proof to have visited an Andaman school for at least 10 years. They had hardly any 
chance to get an official seat or job. 
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communities and then identified those who were 'educationally and historically back-
ward' (Biswas, 2010, p.133).  
Apart from the Bengalis, there were no other rehabilitated settler groups like Tamil, 
Malayali, and Ranchi settlers, included. Apparently, Tamils and Malayalis did not ap-
pear in front of the Commission. Their leaders, in turn, are claiming that it was a set up 
political game by the Bengalis and the 'pre-42', in which they were not considered. 
Ranchi leaders, on the other hand, did not agree to be included under OBC because of 
their demand for reservation under the category of Scheduled Tribes (ST) (ibid, p.133).  
One interlocutor, himself from a disadvantaged community, connected this injustice 
to a lack of political voice as vote bank caused by their meager numerical strength. 
Following the same logic, most other people I talked to, have linked the Bengali set-
tlers' success in getting OBC to their population size. Another important factor was the 
influence of the former MP, who himself belongs to a Bengali family.  
The outcome of the decision, i.e. which particular communities have got benefits, 
highlights how local power structures are determined by opportunities to articulate 
voice. One needs be heard by the government authorities in order to achieve some-
thing. Under the prior reservation system, pre-42 communities and Bengali settlers 
had already received the majority of seats and government jobs. They can be regarded 
as comparatively advanced communities with a high proportion of middle class gov-
ernment servants.  
Due to that, they were able to mobilise the support of a lot of influential intermediar-
ies and politicians. These, in turn, were capable to raise enough voice within dominant 
political frameworks. When I interviewed several leaders of the benefited communi-
ties, I asked them about their opinion what the reasons for the final decision about 
OBC were: their most important and politically viable argument was, that, in opposi-
tion to independent migrants, both groups had been brought to the Andamans by the 
state; they were historically backward due to poor infrastructure and educational fa-
cilities, too; as a consequence, the state would have to take over responsibility for 
their welfare. These statements point out to what extent the legacy of migration and 
social engineering policies continues to shape the actual political landscape.  
Further, pre-42 spokespersons instrumentalized genealogical arguments for their 
cause. This is typical for processes of ethnicization in nation-states (Balibar/ Waller-
stein, 1990, p.122-23). Accordingly, their ancestors were “freedom fighters”, who 
fought against the British and Japanese regimes. They have argued that contemporary 
pre-42 people would be qualified to receive governmental support as compensation 
for the past suffering of their ancestors (Zehmisch 2011).  
Another criteria for their supposed eligibility was the ‘ius soli’, the territorial principle. 
One pre-42 interlocutor emphasised that they were the ”original colonizers”.37 As the 
first people, who settled ‘upon’ the land, he represented the community as “sons of 
the Andamanese soil“ (see also: Biswas, 2010, p.133; Dhingra, 2005, p.168). Nonethe-
                       
37 One interlocutor presented a particular local identity in the following way: “We were brought here by the British. 
I am a descendant in the 4th generation. Now there is high pressure by the migrants. In British times we were not 
very well; under the Japanese, the economy was nearly zero. After the Japanese occupation we started from noth-
ing. My family had 4 acres of land. Whatever has been done here, we did on our own. This is our identity, our con-
tribution and our culture.“  
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less, they regard themselves as different from the indigenous peoples, who are per-
ceived to be ‘of the land’ (cf. Ingold, 2000, p.135). 
Community leaders of rehabilitated settlers from East Bengal have appropriated quite 
similar arguments: they have claimed to be historically backward according to their 
ancestors' displacement; their isolated settlement in vast jungle areas has contributed 
to their educational backwardness; life at the frontier was replete of hostile 'nature’, 
including dangerous animals and ‘savages’; they have been deprived of communica-
tion and infrastructure, too. 
Like a self-fulfilling prophecy of previous warnings of communalism, the introduction 
of OBC quota for these two categories has provoked a political 'chain reaction' among 
other communities. Many leaders are now trying to emphasize the 'backwardness' of 
their communities vis-a-vis the administration. Associations of Malayali, Telugu and 
Tamil 'settlers' are demanding equal treatment with Bengalis as OBC. Politicians and 
other intermediaries, mostly of the language associations, also started insist on reser-
vations as Scheduled Tribes (ST) or Scheduled Castes (SC) in order to appease their 
clients and to strengthen the unity of their vote bank. Many of these claims are based 
on reservations given to their communities on the Indian mainland. This goes along 
with a process of objectification of ethnic and cultural identities connected to a com-
mon 'place of origin'.  
Bengali politicians, for example, have demanded an equal entitlement as in West Ben-
gal, when they are claiming SC for large numbers of Bengali settlers, who belong to 
the Namasudra community; Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), a Dalit party, demands SC res-
ervation for all Dalits in the Andamans on equal terms with reservation policies in the 
mainland; the Ranchis, on the other hand, do not demand a SC or OBC status; one of 
their leaders told me that only a ST status like in the mainland would be appropriate 
for “true Adivasis”. 
The most obvious field, in which such political competition between different commu-
nities materializes, is the very discourse about migration. Here, a migrant society de-
bates its own foundation by deducing entitlements from their their own migration 
history. Arguments from the national and the global sphere are central to local dis-
course. As a result, cultural hybridity, with its emphasis on the incorporation of diver-
sity, is still a much celebrated aspect of social cohesion and conviviality. However, as 
political competition encompasses the articulation and representation of separate 
'bounded' and exclusive ethnic groups, this norm is currently under transformation. 
Whereas the societal set up of Mini-India has been quite easily adaptable to new mi-
grants, the settlement of whole families through networks of chain migration created 
various forms of political, social, cultural and economic exclusion. This has ramifica-
tions for the whole migration discourse, in which the question “Who is a local?” be-
comes increasingly prevalent.   
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3. Migration and the Politics of Locality 
 
Between 1951 and 2011, postcolonial settlement policies and unplanned, independ-
ent chain migrations led to an official population increase of around twelve times.38 
Such demographic growth was probably neither planned nor expected by the Indian 
government. It turned out to be a major cost factor for the state, which, due to insuf-
ficient agricultural production, has to maintain the supply of its Andaman citizens with 
subsidized consumer goods from the mainland.39 
Broader conceptualizations of migration as a problem for the Andamans emerged in 
the 1980s. Arguments against migration have been based on Malthusian perceptions 
of overpopulation and the scarcity of natural resources.40 Main participants in this 
discourse have been civil society actors from the mainland and local spokespersons, 
especially from the local-born community.41  
These actors have put political pressure on the administration and the Indian govern-
ment to stop further immigration.42 Scholars and NGOs have critiqued the administra-
tion for its “open gate policy of allowing unrestricted migration to the Andamans” 
(Naidu, 1998, p.240). Harsh critique has also been formulated against the former Ben-
gali Member of Parliament. Accordingly, he had enabled large-scale migrations of 
Bengalis and supported subsequent regularisations of their encroachments in order to 
gain their votes.  
Ongoing discussions about the introduction of an “Inner-Line Permit”, similarly to the 
existing one in the Indian Union Territory of Lakshadweep, are a result of popular agi-
tations against internal migration. The objective of an Inner-Line Permit is to stop or 
                       
38 1951: 30.971; 1971: 115.133; 1991: 280.661 (Directorate of Statistics, Port Blair, cited in: Dhingra, 2005, p.168). 
While the data for 2001 numbered 356.265, the provisional census data of 2011 gives a total population figure of  
mere 379,944 people (THE DAILY TELEGRAMS, 2011). This increase does not correspond with estimations of many 
local interlocutors, who believe that the population must number between 500.000 and 600.000 people due to 
continuous migrations. The local estimations seem to be more realistic, indeed, as official institutions such as the 
Census and the National Sample Survey (NSS) tend to “underestimate population mobility and labour migration to 
a significant extent” (Srivastava 1998: 584). This gap in enumeration becomes comprehensible by looking at the 
reliance on survey instruments with which permanent and semi-permanent migration can be primarily covered. It 
is less effective to assess short duration circular or seasonal migration (Gidwani/ Sivaramakrishnan 2004: 346).    
39 From a pure economic perspective, it becomes clear that the costs this project of settling subaltern populations 
has caused, do not outweigh its financial profits. The motivation to populate the islands after independence was 
clearly strategic; however, the subsidies for five hundred thousand people have become an inevitable necessity of 
state hegemony. The maintenance of public institutions, and the development of the territory have been dictated 
by the obligation to provide services to the people and their demanding political leaders, contractors, and bureau-
crats, who appropriate the largest surpluses for themselves. 
40 “In the last 20 years, the Andamans have been increasingly ravaged for resources and used as a dumping ground 
for the landless” (Whitaker and Whitaker, 1984, p.16 cited in: Venkateswar, 2004, p.132) 
41 Hinting at the increasing pollution, population density and depletion of the 'natural' environment caused by 
demographic changes in Port Blair, one 'local-born' interlocutor told me: “I cannot hear the birds singing any more. 
I cannot breathe freely. I have to take showers three or four times a day, because it has become so hot. Earlier, we 
had nine months of rain every year. Now we have only six. It has never been so hot that we needed a fan. It was a 
paradise for us. Today, everywhere are buildings, it is hot and dirty. The islands are overpopulated and we face 
drinking water problems. If we don’t stop migration, the islands will become a desert.” 
42 Several interlocutors told me that an influential study, initiated by the government in 1987, came to the conclu-
sion that the carrying capacity of the islands had already approached its limit of 250.000 people. In 1988, it was 
officially recommended to control population growth up to a level of 450.000 people in 2011. However, migration 
has not been stopped since then, probably because local businessmen are in need of a continuous flow of cheap 
migrant labour for 'development' projects. 
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severely limit the access of mainlanders to the Andamans by declaring it illegal. Simi-
larly, the on-going issuance of Islander Identity Cards that officially prove the local 
belonging of each individual, can be regarded as administrative step towards creating 
an islander identification. 
Parallel to this migration discourse, the representation of Mini-India as a 'melting pot' 
model of cultural hybridity has transformed into a 'container' model of separated eth-
nic communities, or objectified 'cultures', which are supposed to be essentially differ-
ent. Ironically, the cultural creolization of the local-born, which can be defined as their 
'ethnic' characteristic, has turned into a political means of 'local' self-definition in op-
position to migrant communities. While their incorporation of Otherness into a “com-
posed whole” is formulated as fundamental value of being local, it is increasingly rep-
resented as marker of difference to other diasporic communities.43  
Further, many local-borns distinguish their place attachment by claiming to have “a 
heart for the islands”. They declare that their feeling of 'home' would clearly distin-
guish them from their political opponents, the so called “opportunistic migrants”, who 
have their ‘roots’ in the mainland.44 Migrants are suspected to have come to the An-
damans for the sole purpose of earning money. Their lack of attachment to the place 
would then, inevitably, lead them to destroy the fragile islands ecosystem. 
As a result of such civil society intervention, subaltern migrants have become a scape-
goat for environmental degradation, too. The current Zeitgeist of global, or planetary 
perceptions of climate change, has become intertwined with local conservation poli-
tics and policies. In the discourse about sustainable protection of the environment, 
the problematized figure of the migrant/encroacher appears as major obstacle to con-
servation measures.45 Migrants' 'hunger for land' is blamed to cause the destruction 
of both the island biosphere as well as the protected habitat of the indigenous hunter-
gatherers. Indeed, many landless subalterns have encroached forest or revenue land 
and built houses and gardens. The clearing of rainforest has damaged the ecosystem, 
caused erosion and drinking water scarcity, and contributed to a loss of biodiversity.  
Nonetheless, such damage occurred because the whole society is utilizing limited re-
sources. Not only migrants, but people from all communities have encroached forest 
and revenue land. Many felt the need to sustain growing numbers of joint family 
                       
43 A local-born leader told me: ”We have a distinct cultural feature: We are a mixture of everything; we never said I 
am Bihari, Bengali or Tamil…, but now, after the arrival of the migrants everybody says: I am Bengali, I am Ranchi. 
The migrants, especially from Bengal and Tamil Nadu, have come here and built up water-tight compartments.” 
44 One local-born interlocutor polarized the distinction to the migrants in the following way: “We were the real 
colonizers, when the British left. The islands are our property. After Independence there were job opportunities and 
land available. That’s why the migrants came from the mainland. It was a paradise for them.” Such representations 
of belonging have to be interpreted within the larger context of local politics of recognition. They can be explained 
with the local-borns' gradual loss of political dominance to more numerous communities. Many old inhabitants 
have expressed fears to become “second-class citizens” and strangers in their 'own' homelands (Tamta, 1991, 
p.122).  
45 The removal of illegal encroachers had been on the agenda of several parties during election campaign for the  
Indian Parliament in 2009. Further, there were several legislative and executive debates and measures to remove 
encroachers in order to protect the biosphere and the indigenous people in recent years. Since ecological con-
sciousness has influenced a Supreme Court Order of 2002 to protect the forests, encroachers are under permanent 
threat of eviction (cf. Sekhsaria, 2007, p.84-6). Some had been removed from their encroachments, while the ma-
jority remains on their lands in a state of insecurity and without perspective to be rehabilitated. These actual politi-
cal developments cannot be regarded as phenomena that are isolated from the migration discourse; they are 
entangled with concurrent conceptualizations of migration as a problem. 
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members or wanted to spatially expand their cash crop plantations. All sorts of set-
tlers and migrants have been using forest resources according to their requirements; 
they are hunting, gathering, collecting raw materials for houses, et cetera. Poachers 
are selling their illegal prey to customers in Port Blair and shark fins are exported to 
South East Asia and Japan. A just solution to these problems, therefore, needs to ad-
dress all stakeholders involved. It requires taking into consideration livelihood issues 
of 'speechless' subalterns, instead of taking decisions or making politics above their 
head.    
Questions of utility and damage, in which migration has been debated in the Andaman 
society, have, of course, not only been linked up to environment and conservation 
issues; they have been connected to questions of nationalism and security, too. While 
the interior frontier is constituted by the 'junglescape' of tropical Andaman rainforests, 
the external, maritime frontier is defined by the the EEZ, the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(ranging from 12 until 200 miles off the coastline). In this peripheral zone of the Indian 
subcontinent, the effectiveness of the nation-state itself is at stake. Large parts of lo-
cal media and the administration, therefore, often connected the sensitive issue of 
territorial governance with debates about migration (cf. Andaman Sheeka, 2009).   
The policing of territorial waters has been justified by fears of foreign military inva-
sions and allied secret service activities. In order to augment the protection of sea 
borders, local fishermen and the population have increasingly been co-opted as “eyes 
and ears of the security agencies” (THE DAILY TELEGRAMS, 2012). Moreover, the Indi-
an military has also emphasized its task as protector of the nation; in line with global 
border policies, it has intensified surveillance activities against illegal poaching, piracy, 
transnational terrorism, as well as contraband and drug trade (Nayyar, 2005, p.86). 
This restrictive policy not only relegated foreigners to the role of malevolent 'intrud-
ers' into India; it also criminalized people different kinds of people moving across the 
Andaman sea in the Bay of Bengal: Thai, Burmese, Bangladeshi or Sri Lankan fisher-
men have been captured and fixed by the Indian Coast Guard (cf. Andaman Chronicle, 
2009; Krishnaswamy, 2009). 
Additionally, the increased policing of borders should hinder illegal migrants from 
Bangladesh,46 Sri Lanka, Thailand or Burma to squat and encroach the islands (cf. Ga-
yatri, 2010). Moreover, there is a debate among the islanders about ‘bonded labour’ 
from Bangladesh; it reminds one of discourses about feminized ‘flesh trade’ and ‘hu-
man trafficking’ of illegalized migrants in the European migration regime. Both dis-
courses are dominated by xenophobic conceptualizations of migration as a threat, and 
its counterpart, the 'benevolent' saving of victimized migrants, who, through their 
designation as victims, are deprived of their agency. Persistent representations of mi-
gration as a 'plague' or 'disease', for which a 'remedy' has to be found (cf. Poddar, 
2002, p.113), resemble the migration discourse in Europe.  
The fallacy to defend the nation in the Indian Ocean with military power not only un-
dermines independent Andamans' history of migration as a place to where subaltern 
                       
46 People who are crossing the borders from Bangladesh to India have been continuously termed as ‘illegal aliens’ 
and represented as “an imminent threat to the health of our healthy nation” (Sen, S., 2003, p.611). Here, the global 
discourse about 'muslim fertility' as a cause of overpopulation, is also getting connected to the nationalist percep-
tion of threat. 
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people from all over South Asia could come and make a living. The stimulation of ex-
clusive feelings of 'us' and 'them' does not remain confined to a context of territorial 
border defence; equivalent ethnic borders are made in local discourse. While incorpo-
ration of Otherness can be regarded as the defining quality of the secular and cosmo-
politan idea of the nation in the Andamans, stimulated fears of the Other are threat-





By retelling the history of the Andaman regime of migration, I have intended to depict 
specific ideologies and material conditions, which both shaped the life-worlds of the 
islanders. Labour migration, forced and voluntary, was the major driving force for de-
mographic changes in all periods of settlement. People from all over India, often in 
search for a better life, have settled in the Andamans. The term Mini-India was first 
applied to conceptualize the hybrid and heterogeneous 'local-born' community. They 
were united by somehow equalizing difference into sameness. In the last few decades, 
Mini-India was increasingly used to conceptualize the whole society.  
My analysis of migrant communities has demonstrated that 'multi-culturalist' politics 
and policies led to intensified processes of ethnicization. The composition of the socie-
ty has changed due to the migration process; separate communities have emerged in 
the political field, and identifications with a muluk, a place of origin or homeland, have 
become more important. Politically influenced representations of 'contained' commu-
nities suppose that groups live side by side to each other instead of with each other.  
Mini-India as an idea of incorporating difference, gradually transformed into a 'multi-
cultural' model of perceiving difference as marker of distinction, or Otherness. As a 
result, the migratory contexts of these communities have transformed into a source of 
political mobilization and conflict evolved on the basis of community identifications. 
The conflict about OBC quotas is a vivid example for such conflict; it is entirely adverse 
to the idea and everyday practice of inter-communal cohesion and incorporation.  
With demographic growth, migration has increasingly come to be regarded as prob-
lem. Thus, the migration discourse, negotiated between communities that were them-
selves created by migration, has transformed adverse and competitive. Not acknowl-
edging that labour migration is inextricably linked to the logic of island 'development', 
and therefore, to the economic survival of the urban middle-class, people from this 
segment have started to demand various administrative measures against migration.  
The transformation of the meaning of Mini-India demonstrates not only its trajectory 
into the realm of community-based politics of mainland India. It also adds another 
example to the global migration discourse. Paralleling other settler societies around 
the world, many Andamanis have gradually become adverse to the very idea of migra-
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